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Abstract
This paper is an exploration of the respective approaches of Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques 
Rancière to education, specifically the question as to whether education has a significant ‘effect’ 
or influence on social inequality. Bourdieu’s work is presented in terms of his well-known and 
related concepts of cultural capital and habitus, where the latter is understood as a largely 
unconscious cultural predisposition or attitude that is the result of cultivation as a function of 
cultural capital, that is, the symbolic-cultural manifestation of distinctive class taste. It is argued 
that, although Bourdieu is critical of inequality in French society, his research has shown that 
it is endemic to that society, and that education, which begins at home and continues through 
school to university – including ‘ordinary’ universities as well as the prestigious ‘grands 
écoles’ of France – is the main mediating institution in the establishment, reinforcement and 
legitimation of social inequality in the highly stratified French society. In contrast to Bourdieu’s 
work, which seems to be unable to move beyond the description and theorisation of a society 
that is (apparently irredeemably) characterised by inequality, for Rancière equality may be 
approached as an ‘hypothesis’ in need of confirmation, and there are several strategies to 
pursue this, one of which is to adopt the principle of ‘ignorance’ on the part of the teacher, in 
order to demonstrate the ability of students to ‘teach themselves’ once they have the requisite 
material – a reference to Joseph Jacotot, who adopted this approach in 19th-century France, 
with unexpectedly affirmative results. Furthermore, Rancière criticises Bourdieu for supplying 
the means to ‘distribute the sensible’ in a hierarchical manner, effectively excluding workers 
from the ‘polis’, on the grounds that they do not share the capacity of ‘logos’ with other citizens 
(such as the elites). Rancière therefore claims that Bourdieu simply accepts the immutability of 
hierarchical class divisions in society. The usefulness of these two thinkers’ work for education in 
South Africa is explored in this paper.     
Keywords:  habitus, cultural capital, social equality/inequality, class, cultural/educational conflict, 
racism, transformation, emancipation
1. Introduction
The globalised (and still globalising) world is plagued by inequality – that much is 
abundantly apparent from many sources, and is graphically encapsulated in the 
phrase indelibly associated with the Occupy Movement: the ‘99% versus the 1%’ 
(Conio, 2015:41, 53). How should one understand this state of affairs, if we accept that 
we live at a time when (liberal) democracy has become the most widely endorsed form of 
government? Does democracy not enshrine the ‘equality’ of citizens in the constitutions 
of countries that claim to be democratic, South Africa being no exception to the rule? 
Leaving aside for the moment the global inequalities of the early 21st century and focusing 
more specifically and systematically on the possible connection between education and 
inequality (as one of its possible sources), the work of two French thinkers, sociologist 
Pierre Bourdieu and philosopher Jacques Rancière, offers itself as a potentially fruitful 
place to start an investigation into the root causes of inequality. In their work inequality 
and its possible sources has received sustained attention, as I shall demonstrate in what 
follows. An attempt will also be made to examine whether there is anything valuable that 
one could learn from these thinkers regarding education in South Africa.
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2. Bourdieu on cultural capital, habitus, education and 
inequality
Does the fact that children go to different schools, and that some go to college, while 
others attend university, have anything to do with the ostensibly irremediable class 
structure of societies? One’s intuitive response is likely to be in the affirmative, and it has 
been ‘scientifically’ confirmed by none other than the famous French sociologist and social 
theorist, Pierre Bourdieu. His empirical and theoretical work in texts such as Distinction 
(1984) and Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (with J.C. Passeron, 2000) seems 
to indicate that social ‘reproduction’ is a function of being educated in a certain way, which 
actually starts at home, long before children go to school, and is reinforced by school 
education. This is succinctly stated where Bourdieu and Passeron write (2000: 3-44):
Because learning is an irreversible process, the habitus acquired within the family 
form the basis of the reception and assimilation of the classroom message, and 
the habitus acquired at school conditions the level of reception and degree of 
assimilation of the messages produced and diffused by the culture industry, and, 
more generally, of any intellectual or semi-intellectual message.
In other words, what happens at home, in the ambit of the ‘cultural capital’ – “the cultural 
goods transmitted by the different family PAs” [pedagogic actions] (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
2000:30) – of your parents and family (which can vary greatly from one family to the next), 
as well as their friends and the circles in which they move, according to Bourdieu, is that 
a particular, distinctive ‘habitus’ is cultivated and formed in children. By ‘cultural capital’ he 
appears to understand the cultural and symbolic manifestations of distinctive class ‘taste’ 
in literature, art, architecture, music and other cultural practices, which is the outcome 
(as indicated above) of the various pedagogical activities (reading, visiting museums, 
attending music concerts, or not doing any of these things) in relation to children in 
a family and the circles within which its members move. ‘Habitus’, again, denotes a cultural 
mind-set or attitude to the world, inculcated by cultural and social customs and norms, 
and functioning unconsciously as a kind of compass in people’s lives, mediating between 
cultural practices and social structures. Clearly, there is a strong reciprocal connection 
between the two: cultural capital, as it is embedded in specific, socially diverse families and 
their circle of friends and associates (in art societies, for example), comprises the sphere 
within which the habitus of children is shaped and constituted. Inversely, the habitus of the 
people who interact in distinct social and cultural circles is the condition of the possibility 
of a distinct mode of cultural capital to be established and further cultivated, in the first 
place. The following excerpt from Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984:160-162) lays the basis for 
this reciprocity:
The habitus is both the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgements 
and the system of classification…of these practices. It is in the relationship between 
the two capacities which define the habitus, the capacity to produce classifiable 
practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these 
practices and products (taste), that the represented social world, i.e. the space 
of life-styles, is constituted…The habitus is not only a structuring structure, which 
organizes practices and the perception of practices, but also a structured structure: 
the principle of division into logical classes which organizes the perception of the 
social world is itself the product of internalization of the division into social classes. 
Each class condition is defined, simultaneously, by its intrinsic properties and by 
the relational properties which it derives from its position in the system of class 
conditions, which is also a system of differences, differential positions, i.e., by 
everything which distinguishes it from what it is not and especially from everything 
it is opposed to; social identity is defined and asserted through difference.   
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To this must be added that, if the habitus generates and structures social practices and 
the perception of such practices, and reciprocally is the ‘structured structure’ that enables 
the classification of such social practices, the cultural dimension of such social practices 
comprises their ‘cultural capital’. This means that the reciprocity in question is complex, 
insofar as the specific quality of cultural capital – richly variegated in terms of one’s 
acquaintance with literature, music, architecture, science, and so on, along a spectrum of 
possibilities from cultural ‘wealth’ to cultural ‘poverty’, or, by contrast, comparatively less so – 
informs the quality of the habitus that is engendered on the part of children in a household, 
in the first place. Such habitus, which could be either culturally rich and diversified, or poor 
and mono-dimensional, becomes, in its turn, the generative source of social (and cultural) 
practices (Bourdieu, 1984:114-115). Moreover, cultural capital is just one among several 
kinds of ‘capital’, the others including literary, scientific (these two arguably being subsumed 
under ‘cultural’ capital), educational, social, political and economic or financial capital. 
One might think of the reciprocity between the source of structuring social and cultural 
practices on the one hand, and the social or cultural structures, on the other, as a dialectical 
process, not entirely dissimilar to Hegel’s (1966:142-145) notion of it – where a particular 
social or political condition, for instance, evokes its countervailing, antithetical condition, 
which eventually forms a synthesis with the initial condition, leading to the process 
repeating itself indefinitely. Importantly, for Hegel, none of the earlier conditions or stages 
in the dialectical process is annulled when its antithesis ‘negates’ it; every stage is ‘sublated’, 
insofar as previous stages are simultaneously cancelled, preserved (in a different form) and 
elevated to a ‘higher’ level of existence. As I understand the relationship between Bourdieu’s 
notions of cultural (or social, educational and so on) capital and habitus, there is a dialectical 
reciprocity between them that also tends towards a kind of ‘quasi-elevation’ in the 
development of the cultural sphere inhabited by certain (classes of) people, but minus the 
metaphysical and teleological necessity that Hegel attached to the process of development. 
This is why I believe it is more appropriate to talk of ‘quasi-elevation’, because the process 
may in fact at times consist of a cultural retrogression rather than elevation, qualitatively 
speaking, for example when someone with a high degree of inherited cultural and acquired 
educational capital (from a wealthy, cultured family, and with an MBA from a prestigious 
university) becomes the CEO of a big company, and the pressures accompanying his or her 
new job are such that cultural activities have to take a back seat in favour of accumulating 
economic capital. Whether this is the case or not, however, every successive stage is bound 
to be more complex insofar as previous stages of development would continue to exist 
latently – or what Deleuze (2004:258-265) would call ‘virtually’ – in later stages, and could 
be actualised again, albeit in a novel configuration; the fictional CEO, above, could accept 
a lateral move in the company that would free her or him for more cultural activities, 
for instance. 
According to Bourdieu, inherited ‘cultural capital’ proves to be crucial in being admitted 
into certain prestigious schools, and once admitted, in succeeding at school, whether this 
is an ‘elite school’ or a public school where students from different social strata go. And 
because school education favours those students with higher-class habitus, the education 
system functions in such a way that it reproduces and legitimates class differences and 
inequalities. In the introduction to Distinction he makes the following observation, which 
neatly summarises the theme of the book (Bourdieu 1984:1):
Whereas the ideology of charisma regards taste in legitimate culture as a gift of 
nature, scientific observation shows that cultural needs are the product of upbringing 
and education: surveys establish that all cultural practices (museum-visits, concert-
going, reading etc.), and preferences in literature, painting or music, are closely 
linked to educational level (measured by qualifications or length of schooling) and 
secondarily to social origin. The relative weight of home background and of formal 
education (the effectiveness and duration of which are closely dependent on social 
origin) varies according to the extent to which the different cultural practices are 
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recognised and taught by the educational system, and the influence of social origin 
is strongest — other things being equal — in ‘extra-curricular’ and avant-garde 
culture …
Even in the classroom, the dominant definition of the legitimate way of appropriating 
culture and works of art favours those who have had early access to legitimate 
culture, in a cultured household, outside of scholastic disciplines, since even within 
the educational system it devalues scholarly knowledge and interpretation as 
‘scholastic’ or even ‘pedantic’ in favour of direct experience and simple delight.
Ironically, however, the education system covers up the role of habitus and cultural capital 
regarding success and failure on the part of students, and ascribes it to individual talents 
and effort, or the absence of these. Hence, when someone who lacks higher-class habitus 
and the cultural capital of which it is an expression does succeed in the educational system, 
it is seen as corroborating the meritocratic character claimed by it. At the same time it 
strengthens the system because such individuals are usually assimilated into the higher 
classes and henceforth contribute to the reproduction of a socially stratified society. On the 
basis of Bourdieu’s research, in practice this means that educators show a preference for 
someone who shows the cultivated capacity to move effortlessly from the mere ‘sensible 
qualities’ of a painting to the level of ‘what it means’, in this way displaying the prior 
acquisition of the concepts necessary to ‘decode’ such a painting. Possessing this capacity, 
which is inseparable from high-class habitus, reflects a high degree of cultural capital, and 
the complex ways in which individuals can potentially arrive at the point where they possess 
this ability, is reflected in what Bourdieu writes about the relationship between cultural and 
educational capital (1984: 81):
The possessors of strong educational capital who have also inherited strong cultural 
capital, and so enjoy a dual title to cultural nobility, the self-assurance of legitimate 
member hip and the ease given by familiarity…are opposed, first, to those who lack 
both educational capital and inherited cultural capital … (and to all those who are 
situated lower down the axis representing perfect reconversion of cultural capital 
into educational capital). But they are also opposed, on the one hand, to those 
who, with equivalent inherited cultural capital, have obtained lower educational 
capital…(or who have an inherited cultural capital greater than their educational 
capital…) and who are closer to them, especially as regards ‘general culture’, than 
the holders of identical qualifications; and, on the other hand, to those who have 
similar educational capital but who started off with less cultural capital…and whose 
relation to culture, which they owe more to the school and less to the family, is less 
familiar and more scholastic.  
As already indicated, cultural capital could be ‘inherited’ in a home suffused with a rich 
cultural life, or acquired through intelligence and hard work at school (‘educational capital’), 
even if it is not one of the most prestigious schools. This is significant because there is 
another, equally important connection, between cultural capital and economic capital, 
which gives children or students from economically wealthy homes an advantage over those 
whose social origins do not allow them the leisure and economic confidence to assimilate 
culture. Again it is a complex matter, as one can gather from Bourdieu’s observation, under 
the heading, “Distance from Necessity”, that (1984: 53-54):
To explain the correlation between educational capital and the propensity or at 
least the aspiration to appreciate a work [of art] ‘independently of its content’, 
as the culturally most ambitious respondents put it, and more generally the 
propensity to make the ‘gratuitous’ and disinterested investments demanded by 
legitimate works, it is not sufficient to point to the fact that schooling provides 
the linguistic tools and the references which enable aesthetic experience to be 
expressed and to be constituted by being expressed. What is in fact affirmed in this 
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relationship is the dependence of the aesthetic disposition on the past and present 
material conditions of existence which are the precondition of both its constitution 
and its application and also of the accumulation of a cultural capital (whether or 
not educationally sanctioned) which can only be acquired by means of a sort of 
withdrawal from economic necessity.
The wealthy, in other words, can spend the time that keeps the noses of less economically 
privileged people to the grindstone, visiting art galleries, attending music concerts, 
learning to play the piano or the violin, reading their favourite novelists, or pursuing a 
‘hobby’ such as astronomy, or getting private science tuition, which puts them at a distinct 
advantage over their economic inferiors. Even (or is it especially) in a democracy, power 
seems to dwell less in the political realm than in the economic, which (as one can gather 
from Bourdieu’s research in this regard) has far-reaching implications for education via 
the accumulation of cultural capital on the part of the economically empowered, and 
hence for the relationship between economic privilege, education and social standing. 
One has to add that Bourdieu’s research pertains to France, a country renowned for 
the importance that its people attach to culture and participation in cultural activities, 
to the point of being exceptional in resisting American globalising cultural colonisation 
(Jameson, 2000:54), and it is probably the case that one cannot apply his findings to other 
countries without allowing for different societal attitudes to culture, particularly if the 
country concerned is not a western state, such as Britain or Germany. In the case of South 
Africa, where ‘culture’ bears the imprint of strong western as well as (understandably) African 
influences, this is even more relevant. Nevertheless, I believe that one can gain important 
insights from Bourdieu regarding the relationship between culture, education and social 
inequality or class differences, provided that his findings are adjusted to accommodate the 
different cultural and social stratifications in other countries (Sullivan, 2002). To illustrate 
what is meant by this observation, the next section scrutinises a musical drama written in, 
and representing, social (and correlatively, educational) disparities in Britain.
3. Interlude: The tragic dimension of social inequality
There are many examples in the arts which reflect, and refract, the social inequality in 
different societies – an inequality that cannot be divorced from education, as Bourdieu’s 
work testifies. One such work of art is Willy Russell’s gripping musical, Blood Brothers 
(1983), which is set against the backdrop of class-stratified British society. At the dramatic 
culmination of this musical drama, one of the twins who were parted soon after birth, 
Mickey, expresses his resentment at his mother, Mrs Johnstone, for not having been the 
one (Eddie) who was given away to a rich, childless woman, exclaiming something like: 
“I could have been him!” And then he shoots his own twin brother, Eddie, before being 
shot by police himself. Blood Brothers is a riveting drama about economic desperation on 
the part of a poverty-stricken mother, the possessiveness of a rich, barren woman who 
exploits the former’s economic destitution to take one of her twins away from her, and the 
friendship, as well as ultimate division, between the poor, factory-worker brother (Mickey) 
and the wealthy, university-educated, councillor brother (Eddie), who only learn right at 
the end that they are real brothers, and not only the ‘blood brothers’ they pledged to be 
when they were boys, playing together in the neighbourhood. And the final ingredient that 
catalyses the action into a tragedy: both Mickey and Eddie love the same girl/woman, Linda. 
When Mrs Johnstone, who is at the time working for Mrs Lyons, the wife of a wealthy 
industrialist, reveals to her employer that she is expecting twins – a blow to a single parent 
who is already struggling to feed her other children – the childless Mrs Lyons jumps at 
the opportunity to ‘give her husband a son’ when he gets back from abroad (without his 
knowledge that the baby came from Mrs Johnstone). Despite being torn between economic 
need and her strong inclination to cling to her offspring, Mrs Johnstone agrees in the end, 
urging Mrs Lyons to select one of the baby boys, instead of choosing herself which one to 
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part with. This is how Mickey Johnstone and Edward Lyons are separated, and grow up 
in homes marked by vast economic and social inequality. This was not to last, however, 
because Mrs Lyons soon complains to her husband that her cleaning lady’s fussing over 
‘her’ boy, Edward, is getting on her nerves, and that she would have to go. Mrs Johnstone 
ends up losing, not merely one of her twins, but her job as well. However, if Mrs Lyons 
thought that it was the end of any connection with the Johnstones, she was wrong. As they 
grow up, the twins of necessity had to bump into each other in the streets of the town, 
and when they do, they take to each other to such a degree that, at Mickey’s suggestion, 
they solemnly pledge to be ‘blood brothers’, despite Eddie being discouraged by Mrs Lyons 
from fraternising with the locals. Through Mickey, Eddie also gets to know Linda, a real 
Tomboy, who is inseparable from Mickey.      
When Mrs Lyons discovers that her ‘son’ spends his time playing with Mickey, she insists to 
her husband that they move to the countryside, but as karma would have it, the Johnstones 
get to move to the same area through a stroke of what seems at the time like good luck, 
and before long, the two boys bump into each other again, to their pleasant surprise. 
The two of them, together with Linda, spend a lot of time together, and it becomes clear 
that Eddie has fallen for Linda. Then Eddie goes to university, Mickey starts working in Mr 
Lyons’s factory, and Linda gets pregnant with Mickey’s baby. They fall on hard times when 
factory workers, including Mickey, lose their jobs as ‘a sign of the times’, and in desperation 
he participates in an attempted robbery, only to be arrested and sentenced to prison for 
a number of years, where he is diagnosed with depression and becomes addicted to anti-
depressants. On Mickey’s release from prison, Linda tries to prevent him from taking the 
anti-depressants, but in vain. In the meantime Eddie has become a councillor and they start 
seeing each other, something Mrs Lyons discovers, and tries to stop by telling Mickey, who 
is working in the factory again, about it. This is what impels Mickey to go searching for Eddie 
with a gun, and finding him in the council chambers where he confronts Eddie about his 
relationship with Linda. Having been alerted by Linda, Mrs Johnstone arrives on the scene 
where Mickey is pointing the gun at Eddie, and tries to stop him by revealing that they are 
brothers, separated soon after birth. 
The contribution of socio-economic inequality to tragic social events manifests itself clearly 
when Mickey, instead of – as one might expect – reproaching her for separating them, 
complains that she might have given him (Mickey) away instead, so that he could have been 
in Eddie’s (wealthy) place. With this insight Russell confirms the insight of psychoanalyst 
Paul Verhaeghe (2014:location 2202-2345), that the greatest incidence of crime, violence, 
poor housing and debt, as well as, correlatively, suffering in the form of depression, anxiety 
and other psychic maladies, is to be found in societies where socio-economic inequality 
is most pronounced.
One does not have to be a Marxist to appreciate the important, if not decisive, role played 
by economic relations in societies throughout history, and the fact that this is reflected in 
literature should surprise no-one. After all, it is no accident that economic relations ineluctably 
have a political flip-side, as indicated by the phrase ‘political economy’ – it is simply because 
economic, bread-and-butter issues move people to take an interest in different ways of 
governing, which are inseparable from either having power, or lacking power. And power, in 
turn, is inseparable from economic relations. What makes Blood Brothers significant in this 
regard, is Russell’s insight that economic power (linked to level of education), on the one 
hand, and the lack of it, on the other, can even disrupt, and eventually destroy, a friendship 
between ‘blood brothers’ (who happen to be, unbeknown to themselves, real brothers). 
This is the tragedy potentially, and sometimes actually, inherent in economic inequality, and 
explored in exemplary fashion in Russell’s ‘musical tragedy’. 
4. South Africa, education and inequality
 2017 |https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.82.1.2315 Page 7 of 15
Original Research www.koersjournal.org.za
In the light of the preceding discussion, where does South Africa stand with regard to 
cultural capital, education and social inequality? To begin with, as far as economic inequality 
goes, although French society (and some other European societies, like the British) is highly 
stratified, the inequality that obtains there is nowhere near that which exists in South Africa, 
for historical reasons that are known to most, if not all, South African academics, and to 
many other citizens as well. There is simply no comparison between poverty levels in France 
or Britain (except among migrants and refugees that have flocked to these countries for 
the last few years) and economic hardship in South Africa with its conspicuous squatter 
shanty-towns on the outskirts of cities, and where not a day passes when one does not see 
people begging at traffic lights, or when the army of car attendants at shopping centres 
and elsewhere reminds one concretely of the pervasiveness of poverty in this country. With 
regard to this situation, Naomi Klein states the following about inequality in South Africa 
(Klein 2007: 198):
In the years that passed between Mandela’s writing his note from prison 
[in 1990, on the supposedly ‘unnegotiable’ ANC economic principle of nationalisation 
of key industries; see p. 194-195] and the ANC’s 1994 election sweep in which he 
was elected president, something happened to convince the party hierarchy that it 
could not use its grass-root prestige to reclaim and redistribute the country’s stolen 
wealth. So, rather than meeting in the middle between California and the Congo, 
the ANC exploded both inequality and crime to such a degree that South Africa’s 
divide is now closer to Beverley Hills and Baghdad. Today [Klein’s book appeared 
in 2007], the country stands as a living testament to what happens when economic 
reform is severed from political transformation. Politically, its people have the 
right to vote, civil liberties and majority rule. Yet economically, South Africa has 
surpassed Brazil as the most unequal society in the world.   
Furthermore, the poverty in South Africa referred to above is highly relevant to the access 
that students from poor families, as opposed to those from middle class and wealthy 
families, have to schools with a good academic track record and the financial resources that 
usually (if not always) go hand in hand with academic success. For these reasons the state 
of education in South Africa is not comparable to that which is the case in France or Britain 
either, despite which I believe one can learn from, and adapt Bourdieu’s theory (and learn 
from Rancière’s critique of Bourdieu, below). Some of the main reasons why allowances 
have to be made for the differences between these European countries and South Africa, 
concern the fundamental social, economic and cultural differences between the former and 
the latter. 
Some of these differences are highlighted by the experience that Gary Koekemoer, 
a mediator (who is a PhD-student doing research on race and race relations in South Africa) 
at a South African high school for girls has had for the past six months, mediating between 
opposing parties at the school in relation to what might be termed ‘cultural-educational 
conflict’. The school concerned is an old, well-established, traditional high school in the 
western sense, which has for a long time been open to students of all races or, more to the 
point, cultures. Only relatively recently did cracks start appearing in its cultural-educational 
edifice, when a white student was overheard complaining about African students ululating 
at a school assembly in the course of singing, followed by the dissemination of this 
information on social media, which, in turn, has led to a widespread confrontation between 
‘traditionalists’ and ‘progressives’ at the school (with parents weighing in on the matter too), 
with the former defending the age-old (western) cultural practices of the school – including 
retaining the names of the various ‘houses’, which still bear the names of British queens – 
and the latter arguing that these practices smack of colonial values, and should be changed 
to reflect contemporary South African culture. A discourse-analysis (below) of Koekemoer’s 
summary of the state of affairs at the high school in question indicates what is at stake here, 
and foregrounds similarities as well as differences between the situation in France and 
South Africa as far as the relationship between ‘culture’ (or cultural capital) and education is 
 2017 |https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.82.1.2315 Page 8 of 15
Original Research www.koersjournal.org.za
concerned. What becomes evident immediately, from the summary in question, is that the 
issues that are contested in South Africa are fundamentally different from those that are 
disputed in France. 
Koekemoer’s summary of insights (April 2017) gained in the course of mediation (which 
I here use with his permission) at the school reads as follows:
5. “Key ‘truths’ informing engagement:
1. What problem? Isolated incidents…being blown out of proportion by 
politically motivated elements and pandering to such select groups in the 
interest of being PC exacerbates the situation;
2. Death by transformation: by transforming (namely more black/township/
poor pupils) debt will increase and academic standards will drop;
3. Us vs. them: all whites are the same, all blacks are the same; whites are 
inherently racist and protect their privileges at all costs, blacks are all 
demands but no effort –happy to take the benefit but not to shoulder the 
burden;
4. Our time to eat: blacks want to punish whites for apartheid,…[the school] 
is a proxy for black revenge;
5. …[A local upper middle class suburb] rules the waves: The school should 
reflect the values and aspirations of the upper/middle class (white) suburbs 
(…[a local high school for boys] being the standard that …[the girls’ high 
school] must follow); 
6. Spare the rod, spoil the child: compliance is best ensured through strict 
enforcement (discipline) and targeting/punishing pupils is the best way to 
manage non-compliant parents. Any slippage on rules will lead to institu-
tional collapse;
7. Go big or go home: change is only possible (best) through disruptive con-
frontation (‘in your face’) and measured by quick outcomes in response;
8. Everything must go: transformation means doing away with all tradition; 
9. It’s one or nothing: …[the girls’ high school] culture cannot accommodate 
many cultures;
10. FIFA: Fit in or fly away: if you don’t like it (both: current status quo or trans-
formed institute) you can leave, you signed up for it vs. get with the reality 
of SA;
11. Academics “über alles”: academic achievement is the priority – it’s THE 
output that ensures success later in life;
12. Racism starts at home: the home environment is where racism is learnt, 
parents are wholly responsible;
13. Black is in, white is out: any new house names will automatically be black 
names, white persons will have no say;
14. Don’t let a foot in the door: any change must be resisted – starts as small 
initiatives but quickly overwhelms, so no change can be tolerated.”
A discourse analysis of this summary cannot ignore what it reflects, namely that, contrary 
to France, where ‘inherited cultural-capital’ issues (such as whether students pay regular 
visits to museums or musical performances, can analyse paintings with ease, and so on) 
are significant in gauging students’ educational capital, such issues do not even feature 
in South Africa. Judging by the above summary of relevant matters in a dispute about 
(what one may call) ‘school culture’, the issues in South Africa are far more basic, as scrutiny 
of each numbered item will show.
 2017 |https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.82.1.2315 Page 9 of 15
Original Research www.koersjournal.org.za
In the case of numbers 1 and 2 it is apparent that the reference to “isolated incidents…being 
blown out of proportion”, etc., as well as to the economic consequences of ‘transformation’, 
represents white parents’ point of view, with emphasis on economic empowerment – if 
black students, or their parents, cannot meet financial-economic demands, they don’t 
belong there because it would affect the school’s ‘standards’ adversely. This is an example 
of economic exclusivist thinking. The allusion to ‘being PC’ (politically correct) also suggests 
that this represents white parents’ views, insofar as ‘PC’ would hardly refer to the position 
of a minority of white people, who show all the signs of feeling ‘culturally’ beleaguered into 
the bargain. The worry expressed about rising debt, poor pupils and dropping academic 
standards, likewise, clearly reflect white parents’ concerns, and betray what is by and large 
their economic privilege, although the black middle-class is evidently growing sufficiently for 
black parents to be able to send their children to this exclusive school. ‘Dropping academic 
standards’, moreover, is arguably a metonymy for ‘changing cultural criteria’, which is really 
what concerns the white parents. Unrealistically, one might add, because in a country that 
only recently (in 1994) became a constitutional democracy, and where universities and 
schools have become multiracial (and hence, multicultural, given the differences between 
African and quasi-western culture), it is inconceivable that African culture will not influence 
the quasi-western, Euro-African culture of whites, and vice versa. 
Turning to number 3 – “us vs. them: all whites are the same, all blacks are the same…” – it 
is clearly an allusion to a form of racism held by parents from both racial groups, which is 
tantamount to a belief that neither group can change their fundamentally held convictions 
about the other group. Belief expressed by black people, that “whites are inherently racist” 
seems to evince a form of racism that Hardt and Negri (2001:190-195) call ‘modern racism’, 
which is essentialist in the sense of attributing immutable qualities to people by virtue of 
having certain racial attributes, such as a specific skin colour.  The view on the part of whites, 
that ‘blacks are all demands but no effort’ could be either an instance of such ‘modern 
racism’, or of what Hardt and Negri (2001:191-195) term ‘postmodern racism’ instead, 
where it is not skin colour that is regarded as essentially determining one’s attributes, but 
the ‘culture’ you belong to: ‘Once a Jew, always a Jew, once an Arab, always an Arab’, and 
so on. (Needless to stress, although it cannot be pursued at present, a poststructuralist 
anthropology cannot accept such racial or cultural determinism, given its point of departure, 
that human subjects as linguistic beings are always capable of re-inscribing their complex, 
flexible ‘identity’ into other linguistic-cultural domains; see Olivier, 2009.) Whatever the case 
may be, such attitudes reflect differing cultural attitudes that, unless they can be modified 
(which will probably happen in the course of time), do not augur well for the prospects of 
a shared South African culture, where the accumulation of educational capital could draw 
on cultural values which prefigure a shared habitus on the part of students. This should be 
seen in conjunction with numbers 9 and 10, ‘It’s one or nothing’, and ‘Fit in or fly away’, both 
of which emphasise beliefs regarding culture – either that culture is immutable and has to 
be accepted as such, or that the time has come for ‘white culture’ to change, combined with 
an uncompromising attitude on the part of both groups. Number 7 – ‘Go big or go home’ – 
also resonates with these beliefs. 
Numbers 4 and 13 go together – ‘Our time to eat’ and ‘Black is in, white is out’ – are different 
sides of the same discursive thread. The first one represents whites’ projection of their 
collective guilt for apartheid (even if individuals may not experience such guilt, they 
nevertheless know, unconsciously, that whites were responsible for it), while the second 
applies to both white and black parents’ knowledge that the status quo in South Africa 
demands redress and recognition of indigenous culture. What this entails for the future 
is not necessarily a wholesale ‘Africanisation’ of culture in this country; with globalisation 
came an internationalisation of culture that has led (and is still giving rise to) hybridised 
cultures, often referred to as ‘glocalisation’ (Steger, 2003:70-76). The same applies here. 
Numbers 8 and 14 are related in the same oppositional manner – whereas ‘Everything 
must go’ instantiates an intransigent stance on the part of black parents regarding so-called 
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‘transformation’, ‘Don’t let a foot in the door’ indexes an equal measure of intransigence on 
the part of whites. Again, such mutual antagonism is not conducive to forging a common 
cultural milieu, with predictable consequences for divergent instances of habitus on the 
part of students, and the complication of cultural capital and the educational capital that 
draws on it at schools and universities.
Numbers 5, 6 and 11 – ‘…[A local upper middle-class suburb] rules the waves’, “Spare the rod, 
spoil the child” and “Academics ‘über alles’ “–  appear to represent resistance measures on 
the part of white parents, in an effort to confront black parents with non-negotiable aspects 
of the school’s traditional cultural values, while the opposite is true of numbers 7 and 12 
(‘Go big or go home’ and ‘Racism starts at home’), which can be related to black parents’ 
strategy to appropriate power at the school. This strategy validates Foucault’s insight, 
that ‘Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or of modifying 
the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it’ 
(Foucault 1972: 227). 
What is evident from the above, is that ‘South African culture’ – if there is such a thing 
– is complex in a different way to that of France or Britain. In fact, one could even say 
that in South Africa, a country situated on the African continent, different – and at 
present, competing – cultures exist side by side, and while mutual cultural borrowing does 
unavoidably take place, these cultures (broadly western, or Euro-African, and African) are 
still distinct. To be sure, in a country like France this is also the case to a certain degree, 
but French citizens of African origin who have lived there for a generation or more have 
accepted French culture and speak French, although the more recent arrival of refugees 
from various African and middle-eastern countries has no doubt complicated the situation. 
The point is that it makes little sense to speak of ‘cultural capital’ in culturally heterogeneous 
South Africa (Olivier, 2004) in the same sense as in France, where there is a large degree 
of cultural homogeneity compared to South Africa, and where, to speak of ‘more’ or ‘less’ 
cultural capital has some meaning. But what about the idea of equality, which supposedly 
(albeit ambiguously) underpins that of democracy? To answer this question, one has to turn 
to the work of Jacques Rancière.  
6. Rancière on Bourdieu, education and equality
Returning to Bourdieu’s work on social inequality and education, his work has not 
escaped criticism of various kinds, such as Goldthorpe’s (2007), which centres on his use 
of ‘cultural capital’ as not allowing for sufficient conceptual differentiation in his theory of 
social reproduction. One could further criticise his tendency to focus on university instead 
of school education, which means that the results of his investigation were predictable, 
because it was concentrated on a population from which (according to his own analysis) 
the academically less qualified students, or from a different perspective, the ‘lower classes’, 
have already been eliminated to a large extent, and not only because of lack of the requisite 
‘cultural capital’, but of capital in the economic sense. The most trenchant criticism of his 
work has come from a fellow Frenchman, however, namely philosopher Jacques Rancière.
In his book,The Philosopher and his Poor (2004), Rancière draws a line from Plato through 
Marx and Sartre to Bourdieu, arguing that what Plato accomplished (and is reaffirmed 
by later thinkers) was to devise a discourse in which the origin, purity and legitimacy of 
philosophy as ‘legislator’ regarding truth and social divisions are established. The significance 
for Bourdieu’s sociological science lies in Plato’s notorious expulsion of the poet, artisan 
or worker from what philosophy claims for itself alone: what Rancière thinks of as the 
domain of fiction (Rancière, 2004:50-53). In practice this meant that (according to Plato) 
the philosopher, in the role of ‘philosopher king’, was/is the only one who has the right to 
articulate fictions, specifically the ‘noble lie’ about the ‘natural’ predispositions of citizens 
in terms of the ‘metal’ of their souls – gold, silver, bronze and iron (which correspond with 
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different classes of citizens) – an aristocratic lie that predetermined the class of the person 
concerned, about which Plato was surprisingly open, compared to later thinkers, including 
Marx, Sartre and Bourdieu, and that supposedly served the purpose of maintaining social 
order in the republic as he conceived of it (Rancière, 2004:17-21). But whether candid about 
ordering society by means of keeping the workers in their place or not, what Plato and 
these later thinkers shared, according to Rancière, is neatly summarised by Joseph Tanke 
(2011:31): ‘…science flourishes to the extent that workers remain subordinate to the master 
thinker’.
Rancière extends his critique of Plato to Bourdieu as well (2004:165-202), arguing that, by 
commencing with the assumption of existing inequalities, the latter manages, predictably, 
to uncover abundant signs of it in the social field. By scrupulously describing all the 
symbolic processes, ranging from cultural competitions to educational ceremonies, by 
means of which the upper classes maintain their hegemonic position in society, Bourdieu is 
merely confirming (and, despite his stated intention of providing a merciless critique of the 
class system) what everyone already knows: that those who are economically subjugated 
are simultaneously under the symbolic, cultural domination of the wealthy. Furthermore, 
according to Rancière, Bourdieu’s sociological discourse transmutes what are in the final 
analysis arbitrary cultural distinctions into seemingly immutable social laws, proceeding in 
a way that reverses Plato’s discursive procedure (Rancière, 2004:179): 
The philosopher started from the arbitrary in order to reach necessity. 
The sociologist reaches necessity starting from the illusion of freedom. He proclaims 
that it is the illusion of their freedom that binds artisans to their places. The declared 
arbitrariness thus becomes a scientific necessity, and the redistribution of cards an 
absolute illusion….
To ensure his kingship, the sociologist for good measure rationalized, absolutized, 
the arbitrary. 
In brief, Bourdieu’s sociology, or what Rancière (2004: 215) does not hesitate calling 
“sociocracy”, promotes the idea that the ideal of equality is a mere mirage. Even worse, for 
Rancière, is the fact that Bourdieu, the sociologist, usurps the throne of Plato’s philosopher-
king in the process, with the same claim of representing the legislative discourse concerning 
what Rancière calls the ‘partitioning of the sensible’ in the social domain. And again, as with 
Plato, it is the workers who are resolutely excluded from the sphere of culture and the 
creation of symbolic forms in art and literature. 
For Rancière, despite appearances to the contrary, Bourdieu elevated the arbitrary nature 
of class domination to the level of necessity, and regarded the ideal of equality as an illusion. 
In his critique of Bourdieu, Rancière exposes the paradoxical logic at work in the processes 
of social reproduction described by him (Bourdieu), which can be summed up as claiming 
that schools exclude students by way of convincing people that they do not exclude them 
– that is, those who are jettisoned by the culturally ‘loaded’ system, do not have the means 
of comprehending the grounds for their exclusion. (Needless to stress, Rancière does 
not agree with this argument.) Furthermore, by arming themselves with the weapons of 
statistics and opinion polls, sociologists are playing with loaded dice, according to Rancière 
(2004: 168) – by the time sociologists arrive on the scene to interpret the results, statistics 
and economics have already produced evidence that schools ‘eliminate’ workers’ children 
and ‘promote’ most of those from the bourgeoisie, and that every class of consumers 
“consumes whatever its revenue allows it to”. Rancière comments on the work of Bourdieu 
and Passeron as follows (2004:172-173):
School…eliminates by dissimulating that it eliminates. Which of course implies 
another trick. In order to perfect the system, it must eliminate in order to dissimulate 
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the fact that it eliminates while pretending not to eliminate. Such is the function of 
the examination in this logic. It eliminates fundamentally those who do not take it, 
those who stop a few years before they reach it. It is the myth that allows those 
who do not go as far as applying its norm to themselves to recognize the destiny 
they deserve in the destiny of those it eliminates…
This, then, is how the case could be summarized: school makes the children of 
the common people believe that it welcomes them and their others with equal 
opportunities, that success and failure depend on personal gifts independent of 
social conditions. This dissimulation is simulated in the games of cultural charisma 
in which the teacher pretends to exercise his students in an aesthetic vision 
transcending the routine of school exercise…he attributes the charisma of gifts to 
those for whom culture has an existence beyond the walls of the school: those who 
own it by birthright and who are able to bring to the perception of the je ne sais quoi 
[elusive quality] the ease that characterizes their manners or their clothing.  
What are we to make of this ironic ‘summary’ of Bourdieu’s work by Rancière? In sum, 
although Bourdieu’s sociology was apparently an attempt — undertaken at the time when 
France had a socialist government that was concerned about discrepancies in educational 
outcomes (Tanke, 2011:31) — to uncover and criticise the source of inequalities, it ended 
up declaring these inequalities as unchangeable, as far as Rancière is concerned. This cast 
Bourdieu in a worse light than Plato, who candidly admitted the fictional nature of his 
philosophical blueprint for class divisions in society: Bourdieu does nothing of the sort, but 
presents the unequal society fatalistically as immutable. Rancière himself has produced 
several works in which he challenges this supposed unassailability of inequality, promoting 
instead a powerful, if subtle, argument in favour of equality.
7. Education, inequality, ignorance and intellectual 
emancipation 
How does one achieve the intellectual emancipation of students, or, for that matter, of 
anyone, including yourself? The answer most people would probably give to this question, 
is that it is done through education and learning. To be sure, but what one learns from the 
French philosopher, Jacques Rancière, is that a great deal depends upon one’s conception 
of education and learning. What is education, and how does one learn? In short, does 
a student, who supposedly does ‘not know’, learn ‘from’ her or his teachers, who ‘know’ 
(as the dominant view on education asserts), and become intellectually emancipated along 
this avenue, or does such a movement towards intellectual liberation entail something 
entirely different, and counter-intuitive into the bargain? Here one has to focus on Rancière’s 
argument concerning equality in learning, and show why it is so relevant for the time in 
which we live, which is marked by mind-boggling inequalities everywhere, particularly in 
South Africa (since South Africa replaced Brazil as the most unequal society in the world). 
In a nutshell – which is difficult to do – Rancière argues that neither equality nor inequality is 
a condition that one can ‘prove’ to be the case once and for all; you cannot work towards it 
as a condition to be actualised, as one would ‘normally’ think. (Philosophical caveat: distrust 
everything that presents itself as ‘normal’ or self-justifying; chances are that it is ideology 
masquerading as common sense.) Instead, both of these concepts function as axioms 
or hypotheses to be validated or demonstrated, and therefore one of them invariably 
underpins one’s approach to educating or teaching the young. So, for instance, conventional 
wisdom has it that the teacher ‘knows’ and the student does not; perfectly self-evident, we 
would all tend to think. If you happen to have studied the history of philosophy, you may 
already be inclined to be on your guard here, even before you have read Rancière, because 
Socrates believed that one cannot really claim to know much. The Socratic ‘docta ignorantia’ 
(or ‘learned ignorance’), which states that ‘all one can know is how little one knows’, and 
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therefore motivates an endless pursuit of knowledge, or better, wisdom, already warns one 
against too smug an acceptance that the teacher imparts what she or he knows to those 
who do not know – the ignorant.
But Rancière is even more radical than Socrates. Appealing to the ‘teaching practice’ of 
a 19th-century figure, Joseph Jacotot, in his book, The Ignorant Schoolmaster – Five Lessons 
in Intellectual Emancipation (Stanford, 1991:29-30), Rancière argues that Jacotot’s radical 
(if not desperate) experiment, to let students discover for themselves something they 
did not know, and he could not teach them, is an instantiation of a radical, emancipatory 
process of self-discovery which affirms the intellectual ‘equality’ of all individuals (regardless 
of gender, culture or race). Furthermore, this has far-reaching implications for social 
equality. There is a reason why I put intellectual ‘equality’ in scare quotes. Rancière is not 
claiming that everyone is equally ‘intelligent’ in the ‘measurable IQ’ sense of the term. What 
he is claiming, however, is that, just as every child sufficiently endowed with intelligence 
is capable of learning their mother tongue – the measure of intellectual capacity – so, 
too, every student or person is capable of discovering the meaning of diverse things for 
themselves by replicating the situation of acquiring their first language, that is, by listening, 
comparing, repeating, attempting and imitating. In short, every human being is capable 
of ‘making sense’ of something by themselves. Referring to his book (mentioned above), 
Rancière observes (2010:1): 
It is…up to me to defend a most unreasonable position: That the most important 
quality of a schoolmaster is the virtue of ignorance. My book recounts the history 
of a teacher, Joseph Jacotot, who caused quite a scandal in Holland and France of 
the 1830s. He did so by proclaiming that uneducated people could learn on their 
own, without a teacher explaining things to them, and that teachers, for their part, 
could teach what they themselves were ignorant of…I would like to show…that it 
is not a matter of taking pleasure in paradox, but of fundamental inquiry into the 
meanings of knowledge, teaching and learning; not an amusing journey into the 
history of pedagogy, but a matter of timely philosophical reflection on the way in 
which pedagogical logic and social logic bear on each other.  
That teaching can happen on the basis of ignorance is borne out by Jacotot’s experience 
in the early 19th century when he found himself in the position where he had to ‘teach’ 
a group of Flemish students French, of which they were ignorant. He, in turn, was ignorant 
of Flemish, but by a stroke of serendipity he discovered a bilingual novel, where Flemish 
and French correlated with each other. He instructed the students, through an interpreter, 
to read half of the book in French by using the Flemish translation, continually repeating 
for themselves what they had learnt, then to read the rest quickly, followed by commenting 
on it in French. To his amazement, by following his instruction they learnt sufficient French, 
all by themselves, to articulate their opinions very well. 
What can one learn from this exercise in the pedagogy of not knowing, of ignorance? 
For Rancière it is an indication of the gulf that separates the pedagogy of ‘explication’ 
(or explanation) – which presupposes that the student is unequal to the teacher as far as 
knowledge goes – from the pedagogy of equality, or ignorance, where instead of explication, 
there is self-driven discovery and learning. Moreover, in the case of explication, which 
supposedly brings the student closer to the teacher, in equality, this chasm is never really 
negotiated, because every approximation of the teacher’s knowledge moves the goalposts 
to another level, involving yet another set of explanations. It becomes an infinite regress, 
and inequality is entrenched, not only in education, but in society as such. By contrast, the 
pedagogy of ignorance, where the teacher is at best a ‘guide’ of sorts, and where there is 
not a disjunction of intelligences, as with the pedagogy of explication, instantiates a relation 
of wills (that of the teacher and of the student) insofar as the teacher is an ‘authority’ only 
in the sense of inviting the student to harness her or his will to travel along a specific track. 
In so doing, Rancière (2010:2-3) reminds one that students are merely activating a ‘capacity’ 
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that they already possess, as shown by the fact that, as infants, they acquired a ‘foreign 
language’ without any previous knowledge, and without a teacher to explain it to them.  
You may wonder in what way this is more radical than Socratic ‘learned ignorance’. 
The Socratic ‘maieutic’ – a dialogic method of interrogating an interlocutor in order to aid 
them in finding knowledge within themselves (what Socrates did with the slave boy in 
Plato’s Meno) – is for Rancière a form of ‘stultification’, or blocking of a person’s intellectual 
emancipation by making him or her dependent on the teacher as master. In his words 
(1991:29): ‘The Socratic method is thus a perfected form of stultification. Like all learned 
masters, Socrates interrogates in order to instruct’. And elsewhere (2010:2): ‘Under the guise 
of creating a capacity, the [Socratic] maieutic aims, in fact, to demonstrate an incapacity’. 
Small wonder that societies, globally, are structured in such egregiously unequal, hierarchical 
terms – these hierarchies have their foundation in the widespread pedagogy of explanation, 
which presupposes an unbridgeable gulf between teacher and student, something that 
subsequently replicates itself in every other social relation. Rancière’s work, by contrast, is 
predicated on the axiom of equality, which he sets out to demonstrate as actualisable in his 
various works.
8. Conclusion
In light of the preceding discussion of the work of Bourdieu and Rancière on education, 
equality and inequality, this paper has demonstrated that, while the concepts of cultural 
capital, habitus and educational capital are highly relevant in the socio-economically 
stratified, but largely culturally homogenous French society, they are less applicable 
here, given the culturally heterogeneous structure of South African society. Furthermore, 
Rancière’s reflections on Bourdieu’s sociology as entrenching inequality, rather than offering 
an effective critique of it, pave the way for his radical endorsement of equality, particularly 
with regard to education. His affirmation of equality in relation to education is particularly 
significant for education in South Africa, given its emphasis, based on the work of Jacotot 
in 19th-century France, on the capacity of any human being (including students) to ‘teach 
themselves’, and on the principle of the teacher’s ‘ignorance’ – that is really a rejection of the 
hierarchical didactic model of ‘explication’, which rests on the assumption that the teacher 
‘knows’ and the student does not. In contrast to this, Rancière emphasises the capacity 
of students to learn by themselves, while the teacher functions as a guide of sorts, who 
merely points them in the right direction. Needless to say, this approach is highly relevant 
in South Africa, where students come from widely divergent cultural and socio-economic 
backgrounds, and would benefit prodigiously from empowering themselves by using the 
means at their disposal, including libraries and the internet, as long as they have been 
‘pointed in the right direction’. *
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